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The Armenian Genocide and an Updated
Denial Initiative: A Review Essay
Joseph A Kéchichian

Guenter Lewy. The Armenian Massacres in Ottoman Turkey: A Disputed
Genocide. Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press, 2005. Pp. 384,
cloth. $24.95 US.
When on 12 October 2006 the French National Assembly approved a bill that made it a
crime to deny the mass killings of Armenians in Turkey around the turn of the
twentieth century, Turkish leaders lamented the decision as a great disappointment,
while several European officials insisted that it was not for the law to write history.
That task, however, is compromised when leading historians deny, in Jacques Chirac’s
memorable words, a country’s ‘‘dramas and errors.’’1 Because experts are lured to
power, sometimes at the expense of their integrity, it behooves those searching for the
truth to redouble their efforts. Therefore, the genuine need to identify and correct
assertions made by those who wish to deny historical facts is a duty both to history and
to the truth itself. Guenter Lewy, an emeritus professor of political science at the
University of Massachusetts—Amherst, is the latest researcher attempting to deny
the Armenian Genocide.2
Indeed, the inordinate nature of Lewy’s resort to political leverage is such as to
render the need for a critical review of this agenda-laden tome even more pressing.
As Lewy has declared that ‘‘a book [must] be judged by its content and not by the
motive of its author,’’3 this review will attempt such an endeavor. Lewy opines that
‘‘most Armenians . . . do not know Turkish’’ (xi); according to him, therefore, few
Armenians may be competent to write on the topic of the Armenian Genocide or to offer
critiques of books on the subject. In fact, however, not only do many Armenians
know Turkish, some are fluent in the language—including this reviewer.4

The Relocation Assertion
Lewy systematic uses and emphasizes the term ‘‘relocation’’ throughout his book; this
prejudicial stance is striking, and the theme of relocation truly dominates the text.
According to Lewy, Turkish authorities had no intention of liquidating the Armenian
population but were merely trying to deport and resettle that population; their
blunders and failures in the process caused massive but unintended casualties.
To foster this perspective, Lewy relies on several techniques, including pronounced
selectivity of data, deflection, distortion, and occasional falsification.
We are told, for example, that the American Associated Press correspondent
George Abel Schreiner explained the fate of the Armenians as merely the result of
‘‘Turkish ineptness, more than intentional brutality’’ (qtd. 254); Schreiner asks us to
believe that it was mere clumsiness that ‘‘was responsible for the hardships the
Armenians were subjected to’’ (qtd. 254).5 In a widely read volume published in 1918,
however, and based on diary entries written immediately after particular events,
Schreiner writes, ‘‘the Armenians are going through hell again . . . [because] the
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deportations . . . [presented a] shocking phase of barbarity . . . .’’6 Schreiner, who had
interviewed both Mehmet Talât Pasha and Ismail Enver Pasha, the two principal
architects of the Armenian Genocide, preserved his unedited diaries. Of course, in
writing ‘‘again,’’ his point of reference is actually the 1909 Adana massacres, which
formed the prelude to the 1915 genocide. Schreiner’s rich text, based on first-hand
observations, since he maintained that he personally witnessed horrible acts that he
denounced as ‘‘repulsive, loathsome, [that] must cause us to consider whether or not
the Turk has a right to rule others.’’ He perceptively asks whether ‘‘a Government that
tolerates this [may be] so low, contemptible, a thing that nothing whatever can be said
in its favor.’’7
Lewy further quotes Dr. Leopold Gustav Alexander von Hoesch, who compiled
German ambassador Wolff-Metternich’s seventy-two-page report of 18 September
1916, which dealt with the Armenian deportations and massacres, as follows:
‘‘The authorities . . . had been unprepared for the deportations and therefore had
failed to provide food and protection for the exiles’’ (254). Lewy implies that
Constantinople did not approve of any hardships and that victims paid the price of
disorder. Yet, in the same report, the German expert categorically declares that there
was no Armenian ‘‘general uprising.’’8 Apart from that in Van, Von Hoesch
characterized the three other uprisings as acts of self-defense in the face of imminent
mass deportations.9 What is even more significant is that the German expert granted
the reasonableness of this right of self-defense.10 Remarkably, his report reveals that,
long before the Turkish defeat of Sarikamis and the Van uprisings, anti-Armenian acts
were occurring in Erzurum in December 1914.11
The selective quotation continues with a statement attributed to Dr. Mustafa
Res" id, the governor of Diyarbekir province and one of the most wanton organizers of
the Armenian Genocide, as saying that ‘‘the disorganization of the State authorities
was so pronounced that an orderly deportation became impossible’’ (254). Yet,
on several occasions, this same governor not only conceded his role in having tens of
thousands of Armenians massacred in his province but openly bragged about it. Res" id’s
deranged rationale was that Armenians were ‘‘microbes infesting’’ the fatherland
(musallat mikrob) and that he, as a physician, found it necessary to ‘‘eradicate sick
people.’’12
Lewy’s text is peppered with such gems. For example, when he discusses the April
1915 Armenian uprising in Van, Lewy writes that ‘‘the Armenians of Van . . . went on
the offensive’’ (96). This kernel is based on the statements of Major Rafael de Nogales,
a Venezuelan soldier of fortune who volunteered his services to the Turkish military.
Yet, in his massive tome, de Nogales actually writes,
The Armenians had attacked the town [Van]. Immediately I mounted my horse . . . went
to see what was happening. Judge of my amazement to discover that the aggressors had
not been the Armenians after all, but the civil authorities themselves . . . Supported by
the Kurds and the rabble of the vicinity, they were attacking and sacking the Armenian
quarter.13

Obviously, these are serious discrepancies that cannot easily be dismissed.
This particular episode was well documented by none other that Ibrahim Arvas, the
former governor general of Van. In his memoirs, Arvas admits that the authorities,
while denouncing Armenians, ‘‘underhandedly were inciting the people against the
[same] Armenians, only to annihilate [itlaf] them at the end.’’14
To further buttress his content that the Turkish intention was to relocate the
Armenians, Lewy expresses doubts about the reality of the drowning operations in
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the Black Sea through which a significant portion of the Armenian population
of Trabzon province perished (181–82). It might be useful, once again, to refer to a
Turkish parliamentarian representing that province, who stunned his colleagues with
an inordinate disclosure. In fact, Hafez Mehmet, a lawyer by profession, testified and
proclaimed to the Chamber of Deputies immediately after the war that he had
personally witnessed drowning operations, in the port city of Ordu on the Black Sea,
whereby Armenian children and women were loaded unto large barges and taken out
to sea to be drowned.15 This particular question was addressed by the Turkish general
Mehmet Vehip Pasha, wartime commander-in-chief of the Third Army, who further
testified that ‘‘thousands of Armenians were also burned alive in haylofts.’’16

From Relocation to Distortion
Continuing, Lewy again cites ‘‘relocation’’ (155) and the problems associated with it,
such as transportation, as the source of the peril of hundreds of thousands of
Armenians. What we must accept is the incredible twist of misdirection ignoring the
key problem, namely the ultimate destination of the deportees: the desolate and barren
deserts of Mesopotamia. None other than the Turkish general Ali Fuad Erden, chief of
staff of Cemal Pasha’s Fourth Army, headquartered in that very same region, concedes
the lethal purpose of this governmental measure: ‘‘There was neither preparation nor
organization to shelter the hundreds of thousands of the deportees.’’17 Ahmed Refik
Altinay, another contemporary Turkish authority who has referred to these masses of
Armenian deportees as being ‘‘driven to blazing deserts, to hunger, misery and death,’’
holds a similar view.18 Following extensive research, Taner Akçam states that
nowhere at their destination in the deserts ‘‘were there any requisite arrangements’’
for resettling or relocating the remnants of the Armenian deportees; this fact alone ‘‘is
sufficient proof of the existence of this plan of annihilation.’’19 This fact was so well
known that, on 16 July 1915, Hans Freiherr von Wangenheim, the Turkophile German
ambassador to Turkey, felt constrained to warn Berlin that the Turkish ally was
‘‘bent on destroying the Armenians by relocating them in barren regions.’’ For dubious
reasons, Lewy ignores this important declaration as well.20
In fact, in his drive to question anything that substantiates the genocidal nature of
the Armenian experience, Lewy ventures into the domain of legal squabbles to buttress
his argumentation, even if he ends up more confused. He repeatedly invokes the
procedures of the Nuremberg Tribunal (72, 80), especially with respect to documentary
evidence, precisely to dismiss the findings of the post-war Turkish Military Tribunal as
devoid of any value. For Lewy, Nuremberg is preferred as a criterion to invalidate
Istanbul, especially with respect to the production and attestation of documents.
One can easily identify a few misconceptions at work in this rationalization. First, the
Nuremberg Tribunal was not only an international body but an instrument of military
occupation; it therefore operated on standards at variance with those of the Turkish
Military Tribunal in Istanbul. Second, the concept of ‘‘due process,’’ as generally
understood, was deliberately circumvented at Nuremberg, notwithstanding Lewy’s
assertions to the contrary. Indeed, article 19 of the Nuremberg Charter stipulated that
the Tribunal shall not be bound by technical rules of evidence. [Rather,] it shall adopt
and apply to the greatest possible extent expeditious and non-technical procedure and
shall admit any evidence which it deems to have probative value.21

Remarkably, although the Turkish Military Tribunal was a national rather than an
international body, and although it operated as a national military court under the
provisions of martial law, it embodied the very same stipulations contained in the
175
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above-cited art. 19 of the Nuremberg Charter. Moreover, in legal terminology,
‘‘probative’’ evidence is that which has the effect of proof, tends to prove, or actually
proves, and is hence theoretically capable of producing conviction of, the main thing—
namely, truth. Even though this was not required, the sessions of the Turkish court
martial were conducted publicly, and defense counsel were allowed to present their
cases, as is amply documented by the opening statements made during the first session
of the major trials. Several defense lawyers, led by Celaleddin Arif, president of the
Turkish Bar Association, took more than an hour to present their cases.22
Lewy further ignores a basic fact when he contrasts and deprecates the Turkish
court martial with ‘‘Western standards of due process’’ (79). Perhaps he excludes
France from the West; the fact is that Ottoman penal codes and the Ottoman Code of
Criminal Procedures are almost entirely modeled after their French counterparts.23
Consequently, there is no room for ‘‘cross-examination,’’ since French criminal law
does not call for it. Furthermore, the state of siege then obtaining in Istanbul precluded
recourse to standard rights and guarantees. As art. 2 of the Annex to the Temporary
Law on the State of Siege provides, ‘‘While the State of Siege remains in force,
Constitutional Laws and other Laws, and administrative rules are temporarily
suspended.’’ Article 3, on the other hand, provides that ‘‘the functions of Cabinet
Council [shall] transfer to military authorities.’’24
Perhaps the most outlandish and patently pro-Turkish partisan claim in the entire
book is Lewy’s declaration that ‘‘no authentic documentary evidence exists to prove the
culpability of the central government of Turkey for the massacres of 1915–16’’ (250).
In other words, the systematic and brutal dislocation and deportation of hundreds of
thousands of the victim population culminated by sheer accident in the violent
extirpation of the bulk of that population. Readers are asked to believe that the central
government, which had acquired overwhelming authority and power, miraculously
became so helpless as to lose control over the arrangements of the deportation
processes because of the exigencies of war. This is akin to believing that the Nazi
government in Berlin had similarly lost control over the network of administrative
personnel in charge of several concentration camps, thereby inadvertently allowing
the systematic extermination of the millions of victims involved! Furthermore,
Lewy asserts that since no ‘‘authentic documents’’ showing explicit orders for
extermination are at hand, the victims must have perished for some other reason!
As Hikmet Yusuf Bayur, the late dean of Turkish historians, maintained, ‘‘the most
important cabinet decisions were secretly made by two or three people, [so] it is only
natural that they will not show up in the transcripts of the Cabinet Council.’’25 Lewy
conveniently ignores the fact that unlike the Nazis, who were obsessed with recordkeeping, the Young Turk perpetrators avoided keeping such records, as well as the fact
that, shortly before their collective escape to Germany on 1–2 November 1918, they
destroyed as many of the surviving documents as they could. In any event, a
clarification that is sorely missing from Lewy’s tome may provide the linkage to the
next item to be discussed: the fact that the so-called central government of Turkey was
one and the same entity as the Central Committee of the Young Turk movement,
the Ittihat ve Terakki Partisi, or Committee of Union and Progress (CUP).

The Gargantuan Mystery of the CUP
The failure to identify the CUP’s Central Committee as the supreme executive
authority and the affiliated Tekilat-ı Mahsusa, or Special Organization (SO), as its
lethal anti-Armenian instrument is truly mind-boggling. In fact, the linkage
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was authoritatively established by Mehmet Vehip, commander-in-chief of the Turkish
Third Army, whose command zone encompassed the seven eastern and central
provinces and, thus, the bulk of the Armenian population of Turkey. In his famous
5 December 1918 testimony, prepared upon the request of the Turkish Military
Tribunal, Vehip clearly stated that governmental authorities (rüesayi hükümet)
meekly and obediently submitted to the dictates of the CUP’s Central Committee in
the matter of ‘‘Armenian deportations and massacres [tehcir ve taktil].’’ Moving one
step further, this vaunted Turkish officer bluntly confirmed the fact that CUP-directed
operations of mass murder were carried out according to ‘‘a resolute plan [mukarer bir
plan],’’ as well as with ‘‘definite prior deliberation [mutlak bir kasd tahtinda]’’—in
other words, with premeditation.26 Moreover, General Vehip exposed for the first time
the role of the numerous convicts who were organized and enlisted by SO chief
Dr. Bahaeddin S" akir; he described them as ‘‘gallows birds’’ and ‘‘butchers of human
beings [insan kasaplari].’’
This last point, one of the foremost features of the Armenian Genocide, is often
overlooked but must not be. At the implementation level of the deportations,
thousands of convicts were employed to carry out the merciless and wanton massacres,
which engendered further hatred against the crime of organized mass murder.
By denying this paramount fact, Lewy is either exhibiting total ignorance or indulging
in unscrupulous distortion, if not falsification. The statement ‘‘there is no evidence
anywhere that this or any other S.O. detachment was diverted to duty involving the
Armenian deportations’’ (85) summarizes his position. Such a view is questionable and,
in fact, fully rejected by a series of Turkish testimonies involving both primary and
secondary sources. To plunge into this kind of research without a command of
the Turkish language, relying on others whose identities are not divulged, is full
of liabilities and risks, even inviting suspicions of intent and an agenda. What follows,
by way of rebuttal of several specific falsifications, may convince Lewy and his
supporters of these risks and avoid further confusion and obfuscation.
In his critical monograph Belgelerle Teskiläti Mahsusa, Ergun Hiçyilmaz declares
that the SO was created to curb the domestic separatist movements that were
imperiling the Ottoman Empire.27 Likewise, Suat Parlar, in Osmanlıdan Günümüze
Gizli Devlet, confirms that ‘‘the SO was an Islamist and Turkist outfit that played an
important role in unleashing terror against the Armenians and in liquidating the
opposition.’’28 Ihsan Bı̈rinci, an expert on the SO, describes it as an outfit pursuing two
principal goals, one of which was to safeguard ‘‘the Turkish race’’ through ‘‘the
deportation of the Armenians.’’29 For his part, Ahmet Refik Altinay, a professor at
Istanbul University and a wartime official who dealt with Armenian deportations at
Eskis" ehir, wrote that ‘‘the brigands of the SO committed the worst atrocities against
the Armenians.’’30 In addition to these corroborating statements, Galib Vardar, an
actual SO chief in charge of logistics and organization, conceded that the SO was
created to deal with ‘‘external as well as internal’’ problems.31 Another eminent
Turkish political scientist, Tarik Zafer Tunaya, declares that the SO was composed in
part of ‘‘convicts’’ and that Interior Minister Talât, chief organizer of the Armenian
Genocide, was a partner in its creation and in formulating its missions.32 Sevket
Süreyya Aydemir, the author of multiple volumes on the CUP and on CUP leader
Enver Pasha, identifies the SO as a ‘‘secret and irresponsible’’ organization that was
‘‘involved in the Armenian deportations.’’33 Celal Bayar, a Turkish statesman and
longtime president of the Turkish Republic, quoting SO leader Esref Kusçubasi, wrote
that one of the SO’s functions was ‘‘the liquidation [tasfiye] of non-Turkish population
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blocs in Turkey.’’34 A final item on this brief list might refer to the verdict of a
Turkish author, Doğan Avcıoğlu, known to have had access to some of the innermost
secrets of the CUP. In the third massive volume of his series on Turkish history, he
reveals that the Central Committee of the CUP and Enver Pasha held a series of secret
meetings at which it was decided to ‘‘liquidate’’ (tasfiye) the ‘‘Christian elements,’’ for
which purpose young and trusted staff officers were invited to Istanbul to map out the
requisite plans.35 Without mincing words, Avcıoğlu declares that ‘‘the ultimate goal of
the Armenian deportations was to radically solve [temelinde çözme] the Armenian
Question through the engagement of the SO. It was Dr. Bahaeddin S" akir who pushed
this plan, championing it at the CUP’s CC councils.’’36

Conclusion
What is so extraordinary about this initiative is the significant campaign by Turkish
authorities to promote Lewy’s book by mobilizing their manifold resources, including
worldwide diplomatic posts. Universities, public libraries, the media, and even political
leaders are being targeted. Furthermore, Lewy has been and continues to be exalted in
Ankara, where he has been invited and showered with special honors as a star. For an
author who seems so firmly committed to joining his Turkish supporters in denying the
genocidal fate of the Armenians, there will always be scope to raise questions about
‘‘convincing’’ and irrefutable ‘‘evidence’’ (e.g., 80–82, 87, 88), thereby casting doubt on
the full measure of the utmost secrecy of the CUP’s genocidal scheme and the details of
its execution. Rhetoric, in all its grim shallowness, is pitted here against the
overwhelming physical evidence of a crime of vast proportions. This shallowness is
even more acutely evident in the list of countless factual errors that further degrades
the volume under review.37
In an essay dealing with the issue of partisan scholarship, the late Terrence des
Pres deplores the subservience of a growing number of academics to the lures and
rewards of ‘‘power’’ at the expense of ‘‘the integrity of knowledge.’’ He wonders whether
the deliberate misuse of the maxim ‘‘there are two sides to every issue’’ has not reduced
it to a ‘‘gimmick’’ to undermine and distort rather than to ‘‘foster truth.’’ He goes on
to write,
We are now told no [Armenian] genocide took place but only a vague unfortunate
mishap determined by imponderables like time and change, the hazards of war,
uncertain demographics. There is a commonsense sound to the Turkish
proposal . . . [However,] Turkey’s denial of the Armenian disaster is backed by
something larger than mere doubt . . . .38

In a subsequent essay, Des Pres scorns the ‘‘increasing attempts to suborn the
academy . . . The issue, then, is whether or not we wish to be menials, for at the very
least scholars who spend their resources defending the honor of nation-states
serve something other than truth.’’39
What kind of scholarship should we expect from our historians when a mountain of
evidence, first-hand reports, and documented testimonials presents undeniable facts?
In Yerevan on 1 October 2006, Jacques Chirac declared, ‘‘By recognizing the genocide
of Jews, Germany did not lose its greatness and self-confidence. On the contrary, a
country and nation develops by admitting the mistakes made in the past.’’40 Denying
the Armenian Genocide when so much evidence exists is both counterproductive and,
ultimately, cowardly. Guenter Lewy may dispute it, but he has failed, in this volume,
to make his case. His failure is largely due to his goal-oriented selectivity, which,
ultimately, raises a far more important question: Can Turkey aspire to democracy
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when members of its elite and their acolytes fail to face the errors and crimes of
their past?
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T-183/44/A25749, fiches 7153–54, 14. Unless otherwise indicated, all translations into
English are my own.
‘‘Die Deportationen vor sich sahen und deshalb vorzogen sich zur Wehr zu setzen, als einem
ungewissen Schicksal zu ergeben’’: ibid., 42. It should be noted in this connection that,
playing with words, Lewy misrepresents Vahakn Dadrian’s views on the Van uprising (94)
179

Genocide Studies and Prevention 2:2 August 2007

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

22.
23.

24.

25.
26.

27.
28.

alleging that Dadrian misquotes the German chief of staff of the Ottoman Third Army,
Felix Guse. Guse was, at best, ambivalent about such a general uprising. He spoke of
‘‘unrest’’ in some places, of ‘‘fights’’ in other areas, and wrote of general tranquility
throughout. He then raised the rhetorical question: ‘‘What should we do? Wait to see if the
Armenian would be so noble as to refrain from hostile acts?’’ See Felix Guse,
‘‘Der Armenenieraufstand 1915 und seine Folgen,’’ Wissen und Wehr 10 (1925), 615. It may
be useful to note that Dadrian differentiates the Van uprising from ‘‘a general uprising of
the Armenians.’’
‘‘Den Insurgenten wird man freilich zugute halten müssen.’’ Von Hoesch, 52.
Ibid., 52.
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